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ABSTRACT 
 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN MALAYSIA:  
THE ARMED FORCES IN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 
 
By 
 
Afdal Izal Bin Md. Hashim 
 
Civil-military relations in Malaysia have been in existence since before the 
country gained its independence in 1957 during the formation of the Trial Company of the 
Malay Regiment on March 1, 1933 though it was known as Malaya then under the colonial 
office of the British Empire. One of the systems it has emulated from the former colonial 
masters is the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) rules and regulations and laws under the 
Armed Forces Act 1972 (Amendment 1996) Part III Commissions and Appointment of 
Regular Armed Forces Personnel, and has its own military culture and traditions that it 
practices –thefirst argument is whether the armed forces in new democracies such as 
Malaysia continue to be treated as civil service? The second controversy in this thesis is that 
the military’s professionalism and historical linkages has made the MAF as trustworthy and a 
subordinate towards the civilian masters, and with Malaysia’s single party-rule of the 
National Front since independence has made it a tool for the ruling elite to utilize the military 
as a fourth branch of the government or a ‘weapon’ to diffuse dissidents and oppositions 
within the democratic process. The thesis then concludes that for a nation to remain peaceful 
and prosperous can be achieved with a stable government, a good check and balance between 
the three branches of the government: the judiciary, the legislative and the executive, and the 
military that is apolitical and subservient to the civilian government chosen by the people 
through democratic process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Situation 
 Malaysia has enjoyed 55 years of peace and prosperity and gained its independence 
from the British on August 31, 1957 with peaceful transition and has adapted to the British 
style of Westminster Parliamentary-system to emulate its administration style and 
organization. With it Malaysia has suited the United Kingdom’s Commonwealth system to a 
more regionalize system that has worked in a society that is multi-cultural, multi-ethnicity and 
multi-religious. One of the systems it has emulated is the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) 
rules and regulations and laws for the Armed Forces, which are to be subservient to the 
civilian authority chosen by the people through democratic elections. In its short span of 55 
years the Armed Forces have played its professional role in ensuring peace is achieved and 
the development and advancement of the nation’s economy, trade and financial aspect 
continues to grow.  
 Thus the question arises when there is peace and stability the armed forces of a certain 
nation is confined to barracks and only utilize for national disaster efforts such as floods and 
storms, humanitarian relief and aid, and peacekeeping operations in troubled nations which 
the MAF have contributed significantly towards the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
(Barlow and Loh 2003). Starting from Congo in 1960-1962 that a country’s infancy such as 
Malaysia was able to send a contingent of peacekeepers as a goodwill to the United Nations 
and to partake in the United Kingdom Commonwealth’s former colonies(Siew 1989). With 
these efforts the MAF have shown significant contribution in Somalia, Bosnia Herzegovina, 
Lebanon and Cambodia from its nationhood in 1957 until today (Aksu 2003). This fine line 
that entails the armed forces are entrusted to such a responsibility have given the civilian 
authorities the trust and confidence that the soldiers, sailors and airmen are loyal to the 
government of the day and elected by the people. 
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 On January 14, 2013, Malaysia’s sixth Prime Minister the Honorable Mohd. Najib Tun 
Razak the eldest son of Malaysia’s second Prime Minister, in a speech organized by Attorney 
General’s Chamber of Malaysia to international lawyers and lawmakers acknowledged that 
the Malaysian Armed Forces have never resorted to a coup d’état and have never even hinted 
or showed any signs that the historical and traditions of the Malaysian military ever wanted 
political power and influence. In his speech, the Prime Minister focused on civilian 
supremacy in Malaysia and Parliamentary Democracy that it practices since independence and 
the formation of Malaysia with Sabah and Sarawak on September 16, 1963. 
 The controversy in this thesis is to ask whether the military professionalism and 
historical linkages has made the MAF as trustworthy and a subordinate towards the civilian 
political masters and with Malaysia’s single party-rule of the National Front has made it a tool 
for the ruling elite to utilize the military as a fourth branch of the government or a ‘weapon’ to 
diffuse dissidents and oppositions within the democratic process. Malaysia’s civil-military 
model has worked towards being a moderate nation in terms of neutrality and zone of peace, 
friendship and neutrality (ZOPFAN) which it has supported towards the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) in the cold war and this thesis will argue the significance of having an 
influential and mild but powerful civilian authority versus military subservience (Hänggi 
1991).  
 
1.2 Questions on Civil-Military Relations 
 To further insinuate the controversy and issue in this thesis we must first understand 
why civil-military relations is studied in a relatively new country such as Malaysia. Civilian 
and military scholars alike have distinctively argued that at times both are separate entities 
while others have stated that military are controlled fully by the civilians. And if it is 
controlled by the civilians to what extent does the control encompasses on. Should it be more 
on the budgeting and human resources aspect headed by a civilian Secretary General or 
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Director General who acts as a career government officer reporting to the Minister or 
Secretary of Defense. In Malaysia the civilian government officials are the ones who call the 
shots in decision-making after going through the technical expertise from the armed forces. 
For example a technical review of a tank, submarine or an aircraft by the respective tri-service 
of the army, navy and air force is done and submitted to their civilian authorities and a review 
will be done to accommodate to the budget allocated and the needs of the military. This is 
ultimately an indirect way to portray that at the end of the day the civilians are the ones who 
call the shots.  
 To explain this, we look into the Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz’s treatise on 
Vom Kriege known as On War the hypothetical views from him as a soldier and of nobility - 
the modern nation-state, a separation between civilian and military elites has been viewed 
with surprising normalcy. The Prussian general said: 
“War is merely the Continuation of Policy by other means that we see, 
therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political 
instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other 
means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its 
means” (Clausewitz 1832).  
 
 According to the Prussian general these two institutions or groups – the civilians who 
are political leaders or the ones responsible for act of policy, and policy formulation, and the 
military that encompass distinct roles and areas of responsibility. Clausewitzreiterated that the 
existence of the military is viewed as an independent institution by itself that is differentiated 
with a civilian institution, and has elected political leaders as well as bureaucratic actors in 
unison.  
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 However, the existence of the military as an organized institution with weapons and 
arms under the armed forces purview has the effect of using it as a coercive force (Kwok 
2010). Hence, the question of who “guards the guardians” as a threat to civilians and the risk 
of the military forcing coercion towards the civilian authority. This distinct separation 
between the military and the civilian institution has resulted in the existence of civil-military 
relations. Though arguments from scholars that the civilian authority towards the military are 
based upon the principle to agent roles. This existence is crucial as the civilian cannot do 
without the military for reasons of protection against external threats (Welch 1976), however 
if the military is not controlled, it will become a threat to the civilian government themselves, 
and raises the question of the military’s independence and obedience towards its civilian 
authority.  
 While there are professional and effective controls of the officer corps, where the 
military remains subordinate towards the civilian government, loyal and subservient to the 
government of the day – they are also military institutions that use coercive and influences 
civilian decisions, affecting policy and lobbying civilian leaders (Kwok 2010). And the most 
undemocratic instances where military coups use excuses to replace inefficient or too 
influential leaders who exert too much self-involvement– for example during Thailand’s 2006 
military coup d’état to replace its democratically elected leader former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra, or they themselves take control of the state as in Myanmar’s junta 
regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Figure 1. Military Regimes and Military Coups in Asia (1950-2011) 
 
 
In new democracies such as in Asia, specifically East Asia has borne numerous 
transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. As seen in Figure 1 the decreasing 
frequency of military coups and military regimes. Notwithstanding, the quest for civilian 
control in this region remains high on the political agenda of many new democracies, that 
raises the question; does the democratization meant complete depoliticization of the military 
of civilian total control? 
 
1.3 Civil-Military in Malaysia 
 
In Malaysia’s stable civil-military relations, the armed forces have always been a 
loyal and subservient military towards the civilian politicians and authority. The healthy 
relations molded by decades of British rule and colonization in Malaya and later gaining its 
independence as Malaysia in 1957 has made civilians in power and ordinary Malaysians 
comfortable and have high regards to the professionalism of the MAF. The stability of the 
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economy though troubled socio-political on May 13,1969 due to the racial riots between 
ethnic Malaysian Chinese and the “sons-of-soil” (bumiputera) Malays have pressured the 
federal government to suspend the parliament and establish the National Operations Council 
(MAGERAN)(Wariya 2004). An organization appointed as a caretaker administrator with the 
consent of the King. The first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Alhaj was forced 
to step down and make way for his Deputy Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn to succeed him. 
The MAGERAN consists of politicians, bureaucrats and advisors to national security the 
Inspector General of the Police (IGP) and the Armed Forces Chief, a four star general. The 
military took swift action to control the racial riots with instructions by the civilian authority 
and it took two weeks for the situation to return to normalcy (Khoo 1977). 
Another political unrest occurred in 1997, when the Deputy Prime Minister Dato’ 
Seri Anwar Ibrahim who was also the Finance Minister was sacked from the party and the 
government for allegedly being corrupt and had allegations of homosexuality acts that is an 
offence in the shariah Islamic law. He had enough momentum to thwart off the accusations 
and rally thousands of Malaysians to call for a just and fair process and almost had the party 
who had ruled Malaysia since independence shaken to the core. This political unrest made 
assumptions among the opposing sides that the MAF should take sides against the ruling 
government who were oppressing the ordinary Malaysians supporting Anwar Ibrahim’s cause. 
The military were reported in the newly blogosphere still new in the late 1990s that there 
were support among senior military elites who said that enough is enough and that the 
Malaysian government should listen to its people. Be that as it may, the military generals did 
not heed to the claims and remained their soldiers in barracks and did not heed to the calls by 
Malaysians who wanted the military to take sides. The police controlled the situation well 
enough that the government had not think it was necessary for the military to take over 
control of the situation against mass rallies and demonstrations. This comes to the claim of 
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the thesis that the military in whatever conditions or environment should not and will not 
interfere with the democratic process and the democratic society need to be reminded of the 
consequences time and time again especially for a new developing nation and a new 
democracy such as Malaysia that romanticism with the military will end in violence, 
political-social unjust and turmoil.  
Organization of this thesis will continue with a historical background of civil-
military relations in Malaysia, how military are recruited and the rules and regulations for the 
conduct of the MAF. The second chapter will look into the hypothesis of the thesis for a 
model for civil-military relations in Malaysia taking into consideration that it was ruled under 
the British Empire and later had transition from a colony of imperialism to an independent 
nation with democratic rule and constitutional monarchy, a model from Westminster-style 
parliament system. This second chapter will also look into theories and thesis claims of 
Huntingtonian and Janowitzian school of thought and the reflection of a new democracy. The 
third chapter will provide supporting evidence conducted through field interviews with 
military officers serving and retired, and civilians who had worked with military personnelin 
the fields of civil-military specifically on national security and policy. The final chapter of 
the thesis will give arguments and reasons for civil-military relations in Malaysia made in this 
dissertation followed with anticipated objections from the claims made for a new democracy.  
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2.0 ISSUES ON CIVIL-MILITARY IN MALAYSIA 
 
 
2.1 Issue Background 
 
New democracies such as Malaysia practices these lection of active military senior 
officers from the Armed Forces Islamic Corps equivalent of the Chaplain Corps in the US 
Army though the pathway of senatorship – a promotion as ministers in the cabinet without 
the necessity of political campaigns or maneuvers. Since the 1990s these military officers 
retire from active duty when they become ministers in the Prime Minister’s Department. 
Notwithstanding, these are isolated cases but it does a precedence in selecting military 
officers even when they are non-combatant military officers in the chaplain regiment. In this 
argument, active-duty officer serving on a political post such as ministers especially as 
defense minister constrains civilian authority but does not call into question the civilian 
nature of the government (Croissant et al. 2012).  
However, so long as military influence is contained within the defense sphere and not 
in the political and civilian administration, the elected president is commander-in-chief or in 
the case of Malaysia as a constitutional monarchy the Supreme Leader or the King is the 
commander-in-chief. Furthermore, if civilians retain a majority on the Security Council and 
continue to formulate nation’s policies the civilian authority enjoys its prerogative in ensuring 
civilian over rules the military. Then comes into question of Malaysia’s practice of 
appointing active duty military officers even if they have to forgo military uniforms to serve 
as civilian politicians that the acquisition of nondefense cabinet portfolios (such as 
Ministerial-post advisor on Religious issues) and legislative presentation in large numbers 
(Pion-Berlin 2003).  
Examples in Malaysia where the military is recruited through the Armed Forces 
Council (MAT – Majlis Angkatan Tentera) which is also under the purview of a civilian 
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secretary where he reports to the civilian Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense (Min 
Def). The MAT has the autonomy of recruiting military officers and enlisted men so does the 
Police Commission for police recruitment under the Ministry of Security (KDN), the 
Education Commission for teachers under the Ministry of Education (KPM). The separation 
of authority or rather the delegation of appointment is a systematic approach for the 
government to give each service scheme an autonomous decision in selecting the appropriate 
personnel and the professionalism of the service. Though, the ultimate decision and perusal is 
under the Prime Minister’s Department – the Public Service Department (JPA) acting as the 
central agencies for the recruitment and human resource management for the whole of 
Malaysia’s civil service. With this delegation of recruitment, this balance have worked since 
the 1960s when Malaysia had a transition of Malaysianization from British rule and the 
mould and restructuring of its civil service. As entombed in the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution: 
Part 10, Article 132 of the Malaysian Constitution 1957,  
(1) For the purposes of this Constitution, the public services are: 
(a) the armed forces; 
(b) the judicial and legal service; 
(c) the general public service of the Federation; 
(d) the police force; 
(e) the railway service; 
(f) the joint public services mentioned in Article 133; 
(g) the public service of each State; and 
(h) the education service. 
 
Scholars argue that the pressure from society for the implementation of social equality 
and the maintenance of individual rights will pose serious challenges for the institutional 
culture of the armed forces, until recently a largely all-male and highly hierarchical repository 
of traditional values in modern society (Moskos and Wood 1988). What individual rights 
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does a military officer and enlistment men have when they are considered as civil servants 
and also under the jurisdiction of Malaysia’s Armed Forces Act when contradictions arise? 
Will they be charged under military courts or a civilian trial when generals and soldiers start 
to propagate military adventurism? These questions from the government of the elected 
officials in a new democracy would be with clear guidelines from the government branches 
of the Congress or Parliament, the judiciary and the executives. What guidelines should they 
be to avoid a coup d’état? Then in Malaysia, should the military be considered a non-civil 
servant or of another service?  
While the recruitment of the military in Malaysia is under the Armed Forces Act 
1972 (Amendment 1996) Part III Commissions and Appointment of Regular Armed Forces 
Personnel, and has its own military culture and traditions that it practices –the first argument 
is should the armed forces in new democracies such as Malaysia be treated as a civil service 
as it is currently being practice? If it does not, should it be treated as a service under the 
prerogative of the King of Malaysia and a direct control from the Minister of Defense and not 
without civilian authority? This is a difficult position for civilian control, because the 
Minister would also have to get the support from bureaucrats who cling to power and 
authority in the current administration. Or if the military is branched out into a separate 
division and not be considered as a civil servant but rather a branch that is still subservient to 
the civilian authority but only answers to the Secretary General of its ministry and the 
military elites. While new democracies such as Singapore and Malaysia have been successful 
in keeping their generals in check and loyalty to government of the day is enjoyed by the 
politicians, how does this balance become imbalance when generals begin to question the 
government’s policy or when the government budget is cut and does not keep the military 
subservient? These questions have been lingering in the atmosphere of the Malaysian 
Government since several senior officers with the rank of generals and admiral have taken 
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sides in the political scenery of Malaysia. While Malaysia look forward to her thirteenth 
General Election in 2013, the country has been polarized and divided on issues of national 
security, the procurement of machines and weaponry and even the transportation of troops to 
high-risked areas. 
 
Figure 2: Malaysia’s Ministry of Defense Organization Chart 
 
Source: Ministry of Defense Malaysia’s Official Website http://www.mod.gov.my/ 
 
 
2.2 Literature Review: Huntingtonian and Janowitzian School of Thought 
 
Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State and Political Order in Changing 
Societies opined that the democratically elected civilian leaders are faced with these 
arguments: retaining a strong military and maintained it under a system of democratic values 
and focusing on civilian superiority. The ideal system of objective civilian control, where the 
military was rendered politically sterile and neutral, and the civilian’s authority aim is 
maximizing military professionalism (Huntington 1956). When professionalism is 
highlighted in the view of the military, the officer corps and its soldiers are observed as 
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subject matter experts in militarism and being loyal to the government of the day. But then it 
is further contrasted by Huntington’s views that subjective civilian control may be lured for 
taking a stance in political struggles that reduces military professionalism (Kwok 2010). As 
such, the main control is recognizing that the professionalism of the officer corps as 
specialist in the management of violence (Huntingon 1956) and at the same time are 
autonomous in managing the military’s domain and continue to submit and obey civilian 
authority.  
However Moris Janowitz counter argued Huntington’s approach that mentions that a 
politicized officer corps was not only desirable but is necessary in civil military relations 
(Janowitz 1960). Janowitz’s theory commented by scholars that the military is an integral part 
of wider social system and cannot be assumed that its training and indoctrination the ideals of 
discipline and obedience will take precedence over its political and communal ties (Kisangani 
2000). While Huntington assumed that the military would be professionalized in order to be 
under civilian submission, Janowitz looked towards the broader values of the society to bring 
about civilian control (Kwok 2010). Janowitz further highlighted that the military could be 
brought under civilian control by equipping it with the norms and behavioral values of the 
society that created it.  
Even though the fundamental differences between civilian and military remained 
intact, with these approaches, the civilians and military would draw closer together in terms 
of outlook and norms, maintaining both the military’s martial spirit as well as civilian control 
since the basic values of society are civilian influenced. For example, in Singapore and the 
US, where practices of advocating second careers in the civilian sector for retired military 
officers and the setting up of elite military training institutions or officer cadet schools has 
been pertinent in diminishing the differences between the two– there are military and 
civilians teaching officer cadets in the fields of mathematics, engineering and the social 
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sciences, and the formulation of military training institutions are both controlled by the 
civilian and the military. With these methods, Janowitz argued that coups may be avoided 
with the byproduct of the convergence between the civilian and military elites – as their 
outlooks grew similar and their interests would align and prevent military intervention (Kwok 
2010). 
With these two schools of thought, Huntington focusing on professionalization while 
Janowitzian on sociological convergence is seen by scholars as a division between 
institutions and actors. Huntington argued that the military and civilians represented separate 
institutions, and he believes that the strengths and weaknesses of these institutions which 
determines the balance of civil-military relations. On the other hand, Janowitz focused on the 
diminishing the differences between the two actors, highlighting that the convergence of the 
two actors would also stabilize with the alignment of interests and outlook. Scholars have 
noted that the Huntingtonian approach is the relationship of military and political leaders 
while Janowitzean approach is the relationship between the military and the civil society 
(Feaver 2002). As these arguments over time have attempted to straddle this divide, civil-
military theorists continue to focus on civilian control, democracy and military intervention 
in the government. 
 
2.3 Malaysian Model of Civil-Military Relations 
Malaysia’s social and political stability has been a role model in terms of its 
economic success for new democracies. Comparing it with countries that had achieved 
independence earlier and practiced democracy, the military has always been in check and 
remain apolitical when there are challenges to the status quo. The recent accusations in 2012 
made towards the military were by the opposition party where the military were deemed as 
not neutral and has been viewed as an accomplice to the ruling government in terms of vote 
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rigging as the military’s votes is based on their location of duty and not based on hometown 
or place of registration (Malaysiakini 2012). This allegation made the current four-star 
general to renounce the accusation via a press-conference which is very unusual for a serving 
military general to do so in Malaysia (Utusan Malaysia 2013). Malaysia is a democratic 
country even when it has been ruled by only one party since independence. This dangerous 
liaison where politicians lure the military for political mileage whether they are the ruling 
government or the opposition has been avoided by the military elites since independence. In 
this sense, the military portrayed as being gentlemanly and professional has made the 
Malaysian people lured into thinking that the military is indeed trustworthy and should be 
given the chance to administer certain aspects of governance in Malaysia. This illusion in a 
democratic society such as Malaysia has not occurred, and fortunately for Malaysia’s own 
survival in the region to remain competitive and strong economically, and the sensitiveness of 
international condemnation if the MAF took over at the behest of politicians who wanted 
power. This is felt not only by the society but the military themselves. This is one of the 
hypotheses put forward that if the society thinks that the government is corrupt or has been 
mismanaging the country, military support should be avoided and does so in a democratic 
process and not through military intervention that in the end will be managed in violence. 
How did Malaysia did that to make their military maintain the status quo and subservient to 
the government of the day? What was the model that the Malaysian forefathers and former 
military generals laid for the military to remain apolitical? 
 
2.3.1 Malaysia’s Armed Forces Historical Linkages and Traditions 
 One of the strongest points for Malaysia’s Armed Forces current environment and 
situation would be the 500 years history of the Malacca Sultanate since 1400s. The military 
of the sultanate were not of a professional or regular army but through the feudalist system 
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for the people to serve the Sultans or Kings. The medieval navy in those days headed by an 
Admiral known as Laksamana as the coastal borders of Malacca which was covering the 
whole modern day Peninsula Malaysia and the empire stretches to modern-day Indonesia’s 
Aceh. The Sultanate’s navy was powerful and makes the Laksamana an influential individual 
who reports to the Sultan who exercised absolute monarchy then. Over the years, Portuguese 
conquerors then Dutch and British under the banner of East India Company took over 
Malacca until Malaya was given independence on August 31st, 1957 (Khoo 1977). The 
history of modern Malaysian Armed Forces began with the formation of the Trial Company 
on March 1st, 1933 by the British and the formation of the first Malay Regiment on January 
1st, 1938. Five years after the trial companies with the carefully planned operations, the 
British were mindful to arm the Malays for not to cause a revolution and ensure that the 
Malays were loyal to the British’s King and Country. This worked until the 1950s when the 
military did not interfere with the politicians who wanted independence from the British 
imperialism. This also worked with the appointments of the Malay Sultans as Colonel-in-
Chief of respective regiments later on in the formation of other regiments and corps in the 
Malaysian Armed Force.  
 
The Malay Sultans were also responsible for the formation of the Malay Regiment 
and they have been regarded as the founding fathers of the Malaysian Armed Forces. With 
this strong foundation of the MAF, the check and balances between the monarchs, the 
government: executive; legislative; and judiciary over control of the MAF were reached for 
more than 50 years. For Malaysia, a constitutional monarchy system it, hence would not be a 
fair comparison to a democratic republic system, but the balance of the executive power and 
influence exerted in the military has made the military loyal and subservient to the 
government of the day. The relatively young country of Malaysia have indeed enjoyed this 
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political stability by making the military remembering its roots and never to gauge in political 
interference or influence which has worked until today.  
 
2.3.2 Divide and Rule 
 Another argument is the divisiveness of appointments for admirals and generals in 
the MAF. In 2006 the Ministry of Defense appointed the Chief of Defense Force (CDF) not 
from the Army as it was predominantly controlled by the generals from Royal Malay 
Regiment. The CDF functions mostly similar to the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) of the US 
Armed Forces, and Admiral Tan Sri Mohd. Anwar Haji Mohd Norwas made the first ever 
CDF from the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) on April 29, 2005 (Bernama 2005). This broke 
the tradition that was enjoyed by the Malaysian Army. This of course raised the army 
generals’ eye brows and also the paternity of the army generals serving and retired, as it 
broke the traditions that the army was so proud of. This appointment meant that anyone in the 
tri-service of the MAF, the army, navy and air force were eligible to become the number one. 
At first there were some grievances towards this appointment as the army believed that as the 
most senior among the three services it had the birth right to become the CDF, and added to 
its 80,000 strong army personnel with the most allocated budget in the Ministry of Defense, it 
would be practical for the army to be the CDF. Admiral Tan Sri Anwar served only for 19 
months when he retired on 31 January 2007. It did pave a way for other services to become 
CDF when a general from the Royal Malaysian Air Force was also made a CDF in 2009. This 
system of divide and rule became a useful tool for the ruling government to keep the generals 
and admirals in check. As the following will suggest that mostly army generals are the ones 
who had political influence and interference more than the other services of the navy and the 
air force, or having the army as the one leading the charge with the navy admirals and air 
force generals following suit for coups. Malaysia’s government tread on uneasy waters when 
it did divide and rule amongst its generals, even if when there were no challenges or threats 
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by the military. This continues to work with astounding success and may continue to be 
practiced further into the future. However there are instances where the arguments have 
surfaced that the generals are appointed not based on merit or competency but rather on 
political affiliations and loyalty. When the government of Malaysia has been ruled by a single 
party which is the Barisan Nasional (National Front) since 1957 there has been accusations 
by the opposition that the senior officers are promoted based on their allegiance to the party 
rather than the very people they are tasked to protect from external threats and enemies.  
The incident in Lahad Datu on March 1, 2013 in Sabah located on the east coast of 
east Borneo of Malaysia where 200 Philippine-Muslim of Sulu separatists from the south of 
the Philippines Islands of Mindanao captured the small fishing village of Kampung Tanduo 
(Village of Tanduo) that penetrated the borders of Sabah, Malaysia in early February 2013 
(Bernama 2013). The incident led to believe that politicians mishandled it and led to 10 
Malaysian soldiers and policemen being killed and more than 60 Philippine-Muslim dead. 
This incident opened the eyes of the Malaysian society, the political atmosphere and the war 
managers themselves i.e. the Armed Forces on civil-military relations in Malaysia as a whole.  
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Graphic 1. Map of Sabah, Malaysia 
 
 
Graphic 2. The Philippine-Muslim Separatist invading  
the East Coast of East Malaysia, Lahad Datu, Sabah 
 
Former generals and scholars have criticised the incident as having the MAF 
mismanaging the crisis, while some have lauded their efforts for minimizing the civilian 
casualty among the Malaysian people, but the argument of political interference rather than 
professional handling by the MAF and the Royal Malaysian Police led to believe that the 
theory of dividing and ruling the generals of not having absolute military strategy have 
affected the way civilians control the military. The crises has been on-going with the 
formation of East Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) which oversees the East Sabah 
Safety Zone (ESSZONE) headed by a civilian authority and assisted by a Major General from 
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the MAF and a senior Police Commissioner to assess and formulate policies to ensure peace 
and stability in the region (The Star 2013).  
 While the civilian supremacy is still being practiced, the Malaysian government have 
also created an environment of “toeing the line”, a concept that to control the generals, one 
has to ensure that the generals are not in unison with each other, where they are competing 
for loyalty and enhancement in their respective careers.  This works relatively well with the 
generals having trustworthy issues and competition among each other. The former Defense 
Minister of Malaysia, the Honourable Datuk Syed Hamid Syed Jaafar Albar from 1995-1999 
commented that the political manoeuvres in the military were much complex than a typical 
political party. The in-fighting and military tactics are commonly used to outdo each other. 
Hence the two underlying points to control the military is creating a sense of uncertainty in 
the appointment of the Chief of Defence Forces and creating an environment of toeing the 
line to create political patronage amongst the generals to remain loyal to the ruling 
government as each general are untrustworthy towards each other.  Then the question of 
control by the civilian is done by making the generals look and appear weak only in the 
political-sense but still strong in the military, but disunited, and at the same time the 
questions of national sovereignty is not ignored by the ruling government. 
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3.0 CONTROVERSIES AND EVIDENCES ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
3.1 Creating a Role Model 
In the 55 years of independence Malaysia have relatively been successful in keeping 
military at bay from politics and the remedy have worked where military are kept out of 
political decision making processes, where they are only given a small scope of policy 
formulation and the acquisition of military hardware. A proposed definition by scholars is 
civilian control, “that distribution of decision-making power which civilians have exclusive 
authority to decide on national politics and their implementation.”In this regard, the 
Malaysian civilian authority and control have the power and will to freely choose and 
delegate decision-making power. At the same time the implementation of certain policies to 
the military while the military has no decision making power outside those areas specifically 
defined by the civilians (Croissant et al. 2010). In addition, the Malaysian civilians 
themselves are the determinant which policies, aspect of policies that the MAF implements 
and the Malaysian civilian government themselves define the boundaries between policy-
making and policy-implementation. With these parameters and insights, the Malaysian 
civilian authority have indeed conceptualize Croissant’s civilian control as a set of norms, 
rules and institutions that structure the balance of decision-making power, that is based on the 
balance between civilian institutions as the sole power to control and the military to adhere to 
in five areas: 
i. Recruitment 
This defines the rules, criteria, and the processes of recruiting, selecting, and 
legitimizing political office holders. It reflects the degree to which political processes 
are open to competition, and the degree of participation, that is, the inclusiveness of 
political competition (Dahl 1971). The Malaysian Government through Armed Forces 
Council (MAT) has the authority to appoint and promote the suitable candidates to 
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join its organization but with the careful monitoring of the Public Service Department 
(JPA). The JPA acts as the sole human resource manager that the MAT has to report 
to. For example the pay and annual salary increment, even though if the MAF has a 
branch of an establishment in the forms of the Armed Forces Salary Unit (UGAT) to 
oversee and advice their tri-service personnel of the army, navy and air force 
respectively on issues of pay and recruitment. This creates an environment where the 
recruitment has to obtain the civilian authorities clearance for increase recruitment 
and will be under close scrutiny if there is mismanagement in terms of elite 
recruitment.  
ii. Public Policy 
This comprises the rules and processes of policymaking (agenda setting, 
policy formulation, and policy adoption) and policy implementation. The Ministry of 
Defense under the wing of Policy Division is headed by a civilian Under-Secretary. 
He is assisted by senior military officers and civilians who advises and formulates the 
defense and public policy that reports to the Deputy Secretary General who is also 
headed by a civilian. One of the key importance of this practice is the concept of 
Total Defense (HANRUH), a concept where the civilians whether they are in the 
government or private sector goes hand in hand in ensuring that the nation is safe 
from internal and external threat. This policy have created an environment where the 
MAF is seen as a people’s confidant in times of crises as mentioned earlier in chapter 
one about the Philippine-Muslims of Sulu invasion in the east coast of Sabah, 
Malaysia specifically in Lahad Datu. 
iii. Internal Security 
This entails all decisions and measures regarding possible deployments of the 
military to keep peace, order, and security within the national boundaries (e.g. in riot 
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control, domestic law enforcement, border control, counterterrorism, and to put down 
insurrections) as well as the military’s provision of logistical support and restoration 
of civil infrastructure during its involvement in development operations (Rasmussen 
1999; Collier 1999; Trinkunas 2005; Wilkinson 2006). The recent incident in Lahad 
Datu is a perfect example of the MAF’s role with the primary acts given to the Royal 
Malaysian Police. When internal security is the main issue, in Malaysia the police are 
given the task of leading the operations with the MAF as in assisting role to provide 
border control and logistical support. However when the security has ballooned that 
requires the further management of the MAF as war managers, the primary role 
would later be given to the MAF to eradicate remaining threats. The political masters 
call the shots for any strategies and tactics needed to be done with the advice of the 
MAF generals. The mandate is given to the generals with the consent of the ministers. 
Thus the issue of generals taking matter into their own hands no matter how senior or 
influential they are is subjugated to these channels. 
iv. National Defense 
The safeguarding of the nation’s territory against external military threats – 
the traditional primary role of any armed forces. As entombed in Malaysia’s 
Constitution Article 137 (1), the Federal government has the jurisdiction to oversee 
the responsibility of national defense. The King acts as the Commander-in-Chief with 
the advice of the Prime Minister and the MAF Generals as actors of war. The MAF 
have proven that in times of Communist Insurgency in the 1960s up to the end of 
1980s, the national defense is not only excluded for the armed forces to play a role as 
safeguarding the nation’s territory but by winning the hearts and minds of the average 
people that sees the MAF as an ally rather than an adversary. This comes with a good 
portrayal image that the civilians are in control even at times of crises rather than 
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giving the assumption that the armed forces being managers of war as the main 
players. Though credit to the MAF is recognized for their roles and sacrifices but at 
the end of the campaign in eradicating threats falls to the civilian’s policy formulation. 
v. Military Organization or the Armed Forces Council (MAT) 
This comprises policies that define the mission, roles, and structure of the 
military – decisions about acquisitions, logistics, training, and equipment, as well as 
personnel management and military promotions. The MAT has the prerogative to 
control the personnel management and military promotions, but not with the consent 
of the members of the MAT that comprises not only the Chief of Defense but the 
chairman is the Minister of Defense with the Council’s Secretary being the Secretary 
General of the Ministry. This council has been established on July 26, 1956 since 
before Malaysia gained its independence. The MAT largely comprises more civilians 
than military personnel as stated below: 
 
Permanent 
Members 
Position (Civilian – C; Military – M) 
i. Minister of Defense – Chairman  (C) 
ii. Secretary General – Secretary of MAT  (C) 
iii. Keeper of the Royal Seal – the King’s 
Representative  
(C) 
iv. Chief of Defence Forces  (M) 
v. Chief of Malaysian Army  (M) 
vi. Chief of Royal Malaysian Navy  (M) 
vii. Chief of Royal Malaysian Air Force (M) 
viii. Chief of Staff MAF  (M) 
ix Deputy Secretary General Ministry of 
Finance (Operations)  
(C) 
xi. Assistant Chief of Staff Personnel 
Services  
(M) 
Ordinary 
Members 
  
xii. 
 
Deputy Minister of Ministry of 
Defense 
(C) 
xiii. Deputy Secretary General of Ministry 
of Defense (Operations)  
(C) 
xiv. Deputy Secretary General of Ministry 
of Defense (Management)  
(C) 
xv. Chief of Judge Advocate  (C) 
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This portrays a healthy composition of eight civilians and six military and provided 
the civilian supremacy that Malaysians enjoy. 
 
3.2 Theory and Claim 
Five of these areas hinge on the balance of the civil-military relations that is needed 
on a stable and strong civilian government, and of how much civilian control, and to what 
extent should the civilian authority be highly involved to ensure civilian rule and a smooth 
and efficient democratic process. These parameters is based entirely on the influences of a 
civilian and democratically elected government towards military adventurism, and the 
animosity or dangerousness of elected civilian officials to exert military support which 
eventually will succumb to military intervention and coup. 
Scholars have argued that civilian control is not the only issue in civil-military relations 
(Feaver 1999), but also include the degree to which the military is able to achieve the goals 
assigned to it by political leaders (effectiveness) and the cost of lives and resources necessary 
to do so (efficiency) (Bruneau 2006). Though in contradiction to this understanding, the 
effective civilian control implies neither effectiveness and efficiency in civil-military relations 
(Bruneau 2006) nor good governance in the security sector, it simply ensures that civilians are 
responsible for political decision-making (Trinkunas 2005). As argued by Forster, even in 
democratic new member states of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) in Eastern and Central Europe, the practices of civilian control often do not fit the 
normative deal of democratic security governance (Forster 2006), which includes not only 
effective control of the military by democratically elected civilian authorities but also to 
include parliamentary oversight, transparent decision-making, civil society participation, 
ensuring military training is in line with democratic norms and values, and providing human 
security (Hänggi 2004). The idea of civilian control is the assignment role of the military as 
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defending the society and not defining it (Kohn 1997), though it does not gives us the 
assumption that it is an apolitical military.  
The position of Malaysia’s civil-military relations as a good working model for new 
democracies and the perceptive illusion for certain quarters of Malaysian society believing 
that if the government is corrupted or does not govern to the people’s expectations, the MAF 
should control it to regain the people’s confidence and that the MAF should return it when 
stability is reached. Malaysia’s Armed Forces in its relatively young track record has been 
deemed as professional, and these traits has been the reason for certain parts of the Malaysian 
society to think that with the MAF to act as the fourth branch would make Malaysia free from 
corruption, more developed and prosper.  
 
3.2.1 Theory I: Categorizing Military as Civil Servants 
 Making the military as a civil servant rather than another branch of services under the 
Commander-in-Chief with the same rules and regulations has made the MAF loyal to the 
government of the day, and with Malaysia’s single party-rule has basically concreted the role 
of the military in a young democracy. Arguments are abound stating that the military is not a 
civil servant but as an armed defender of the nation’s sovereignty.  This has worked well in 
Malaysia and the military has been able to be control rather than let them be in control. The 
responsibility of the civilian authorities has made the MAF subservient to civilian supremacy 
while not completely ignoring the fact that military as managers of violence in war.  
With reference to the incident in Lahad Datu, Sabah, the establishment of ESSCOM 
headed by a senior civilian officer with the title as Director-General, and assisted by two 
respective Army Major General and Police officer with the rank of Commissioner (equivalent 
to a two-star general),portrays the importance of placing a civilian as the head, though 
questions arise that he may not be well-verse in the field of counter-insurgency warfare, joint-
command operations and public order – but the vested interest of the operations should be
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coming from someone who operates and sees the bigger picture (Sapien 2013). The military 
operates to control violence but the civilian having the authority to give instructions is 
exercise in this civil-military operations. The military is not there acting out on its own but 
with the careful analysis and assessment made by its civilian masters. When this is done to 
control the military as being a civil servant rather than disengaging them as fully military, 
then the civilian authority has the full control of the military from being able to plan and 
execute a coup d’état. 
 
3.2.2 Theory II: Disuniting the Generals and Toeing the Line Concept 
This part of the theory explains the divide and rule of the generals who heads the 
brigade, division, and the field commanders for the army or the equivalent of the navy and air 
force of the Malaysian Armed Forces. While the army is the backbone of the MAF with the 
most number of soldiers followed by the navy and the air force, the theory is that the army 
would have the added advantage if there were any hints for mounting a coup. With the 
strength of 70,000 (CIA Factbook) soldiers with a population of 29 million Malaysian citizens 
that is roughly 1 soldier to 414.29 Malaysians, which is still a small number of proportions for 
the military to take over by coercive force. The first part of this claim is that the civilian 
government practices its control of the military in the early independence which was headed 
by a British General right up to 1962 that is 5 years after Malaysia gained its independence. 
Subsequent to that the native generals were chosen from Royal native Malay blood or of 
higher class of the Malaysian society strata. The second claim is to give the generals not more 
than 4-5 years of their post as Chief of the Defence Forces accept in 1970-1977 when General 
Tun Ibrahim Ismail headed the armed forces longer than any CDF. This is argued due to the 
instability in Malaysia that was caused by racial riots between the Malay native and the 
Chinese immigrants (Ismail 2005). Then how were the generals being controlled even at the 
height of their chieftainship? The answers lie in the infighting and plotting between the 
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generals to gain favorable points by their political masters. Malaysia being an Asian country 
do not disgrace directly but through a save of face when the generals who fall out of favor are 
not sacked immediately but given lucrative government posts or tucked away quietly doing 
staff work rather than commanding a brigade or a division. This have worked for 55 years in a 
modern new democracy such as Malaysia and the generals have indeed toed their line rather 
than uniting to challenge the legitimacy of a government. Hence the choosing and promotion 
of a general have been based on loyalty, subservience and not trusting each other to make a 
political move that would indeed create a dent in their military careers. 
 
3.3 Analysis and Arguments  
In relating to the theories of making the military as civil servants and disuniting the 
generals through brickbats and untrustworthiness in the officer corps themselves, have made 
the MAF and the civilian authorities in tandem for social and economic development in 
Malaysia. This as noted earlier has worked for 55 years and will be continued to ensure the 
military is in line with the civilian government aspirations. One analysis that has been taken 
is the situation of a nation that has not been ruled by other political parties. For 55 years 
Malaysia is ruled by the National Front Party (Parti Barisan Nasional – BN). BN has been 
powerful in making the civil servants loyal to the government and has been indoctrinated that 
BN is the government, and the government is BN. One concept is that the salaries of the civil 
servants are paid by the BN Government, while other parts of the society argued that the tax 
payers are the one who is paying the civil servants salary. With this simple concept, even 
professionals and management grade salary level (basic qualification of a university degree) 
in the government have argued that when they vote other political parties they are considered 
as traitors. Same goes in the military that they are loyal and subservient to political party BN 
and at whatever cost they are instructed by their commanders and generals to do what is right 
when they vote. 
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Hence, this analysis shows that when a new country that has a single political party 
that controls the media, the government machinery and other arms of the government, the 
question of even a hint of a coup d’état would be unheard of.  In relation to Huntington’s 
approach that the professionalism of the officer corps as specialist in the management of 
violence (Huntingon 1956),and at the same time are autonomous in managing the military’s 
domain and continue to submit and obey civilian authority – which fits in Malaysia’s 
environment of civil-military relations. But in the long run challenges may arise by the 
generals when the government seeks the assistance of the military for political purposes then 
Janowitzian approach highlighting that the military could be brought under civilian control by 
equipping it with the norms and behavioral values of the society that created it. The 
indoctrination of the military that the powerful political party is the government and vice 
versa, but not the government of the people, by the people to the people: then we do have an 
issue to address. To do this, the military should be reconstructed not as categorized civil 
servants but the role of purely military centric task, though the military personnel has the 
power to vote like any democratic country, the military should be first apolitical and not loyal 
to the political party that controls the parliament, but to the people who have given their votes 
in the first place. To undo the indoctrination for 55 years the first thing that a serving 
government would do is to educate or re-educate not only themselves but to their constituents, 
the military rank and file, and the officers corps. A task that takes years to rectify, but for a 
young nation to achieve will grow not only economically but also with respect to its social 
and humanitarian approach. As seen in South Korea’s democratically elected President from 
the clenches of dictatorship grip, Malaysians believes that 55 years of single party-rule should 
be challenged for a more robust and effective governance. The military first and foremost 
should be seen as apolitical, refraining from making political judgments, and to be seen and 
felt as a non-threat to the process of democracy, and last but not the least an organization that 
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has no appetite for political power and influence which are guided by the rule of law and the 
norms of a democratic society stipulated in Huntington’s and Janowitz’s approach. 
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4.0 DISCUSSION AND COUNTERARGUMENT 
 
4.1 Counterarguments to Malaysia’s Civil-Military Relations Model 
Malaysia being relatively a young nation with only 55 years of independence from the 
British Empire in 1957 would be a good example for emerging and developing nations to 
emulate in terms of its Constitutional monarchy versus republic and a fully democratic 
society. Three counter arguments that may arise for this thesis of Malaysia’s civil-military 
model for emerging and developing nations can be described in terms of historical linkages 
and traditions. Why one might ask? This is because military in Malaysia has been very close 
and intertwined to the civilian institution as they are deemed as civil servants and further to 
that Malaysia has never been ruled by other political party besides the National Front 
(Barisan Nasional) or the backbone party of the United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO). What if the National Front loses and seeks the support of the military to regain its 
influence and power? This dangerous liaison would indeed invite the military to be politically 
influenced and further enhancing its role as the fourth branch of democratically elected 
civilian government, definitely a case to be avoided.  
Stability in Malaysia and certain parts of the region in Southeast Asia have seen the 
military asserting their presence not only as defenders of external threat, but a game changer 
for the country as well. In the recent May 5, 2013 during Malaysia’s 13th General Election, 
the military had always given early postal votes for choosing the next government and the 
votes from the military has always been regarded as a safe deposit for the ruling party, which 
is the National Front. The MAF given its perceived role in the Malaysian society as being 
professional and ethical with its own military ethos of being honorable and having high moral 
values, have given the impression that military elites in Malaysia will never succumb to 
political aspirations in the future. The perception that the military will remain apolitical and 
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due to historical and traditional linkages critics would say the military will be utilized to 
choose sides in whatever situation that makes the ruling elite in a difficult position.  
The second counter argument would be that power is intoxicating and what 
guarantees that the military will not have aspirations and intention of gaining political control? 
The “toeing the line concept” would be practical for dividing and ruling the military generals. 
This practice would work in peace time and in operational times, but it would also be a heavy 
burden for the nation during war and instability. Instructions and orders would not be carried 
out and there would be incidences of not executing orders by middle and junior ground 
commanders due to the allegiance camps they are affiliating to in the military organization. 
The military generals and elite would have no command and control if this were materialized, 
and the only thing that binds is all superficial and only serve as surface cosmetics. Divide and 
rule added by toeing the line concept that is to be emulated by young and emerging nation 
would work perhaps for 50 years of their nationhood and further down to the road, with the 
assumption that peace and stability is achieved to progress further towards a society that is 
just and adheres the universal rule of law. 
The third counter argument is the behavioral of the society itself. Where military is 
regarded as men of honor with their own warrior code and ethos and has given the impression 
that the military are not influenced by bribes and blackmails. Malaysia has experienced 
continued growth and prosperity because of the peace and security borne with effective 
military governance with civilian authority. The MAF have been instrumental in keeping a 
safe and secure country where Malaysians could sleep peacefully at night. Since the 
formation of the MAF and the 80 years of history, and later the communist insurgency which 
was successfully eradicated in 1989, the commitments and professionalism made by the MAF 
have been effective in minimizing external and internal threats. These contributions have 
gained the trust of the Malaysian people and the civilian government. The continued 
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professionalism and military ethics is the reason that the MAF is the main reason of the 
perceived notion that the MAF should be a given the task as a fourth branch of the 
government in Malaysia, that is after the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. In 
MAF’s retrospect as being non-interference with the political scene since independence in 
1957, it is fair to have societies in Malaysia believing that the MAF should be given the 
opportunity to govern similar to its neighbors in the north, Thailand, and Indonesia in the east. 
Military organization are seen as efficient and effective to address issues such as housing and 
security with programs known as Projek Jiwa Murni(Pure Soul Project) in winning the 
people’s hearts and minds to support the government of the day. These projects were able to 
portray that the military are indeed fighting for the people not in terms of war but also in 
development and basic infrastructure that the people appreciates especially in the rural areas 
of Malaysia.  
In reality, Malaysia’s single party rule since independence had the military in check 
and the loyalty of the military elites have sided towards the civilian government as they are 
the one who holds real power and influence. Young democratic and emerging nations would 
have to enable themselves as politically stable without the intrusion of military elites in the 
democratic process. Once the rule of law is respected, the military elites would succumb to 
the norms of a civilize society and avoid the pre-empt acts of a coup d’état.  
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5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The civil-military relations in Malaysia are a unique metamorphosis and a blend of 
two distinct unison of the civilian masters as proponents and practitioners of democracy, and 
the military as guardians of democracy. While this thesis have tried to explained the working 
relationships in the five decades of independence and the nation-building of statehood and at 
the same time seeking true identity of a developing country, Malaysia have done extremely 
well in curbing military adventurism and promoting the universal rule of law. At the same 
time, Malaysia is also struggling to converge from the middle-income trap that is a hindrance 
to further consolidate its position as a spokesperson of the developing world. One such field 
is the success of making the military subservient to the government of the day, regardless if 
the nation is ruled by a single party-rule since independence. Thus, the research question of 
whether the military professionalism and historical linkages has made the MAF as 
trustworthy, and later to utilize the military as a fourth branch may pose another research to 
look into. As this thesis explains when there is an opening for military elites to influence the 
democratic process in a young country such as Malaysia it would be seen a hindrance to 
democracy itself.   
Giving the examples in Malaysia where the military is recruited through the Armed 
Forces Council (MAT – Majlis Angkatan Tentera) which is also under the purview of a 
civilian secretary where he reports to the civilian Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Defense (Min Def)comes to the claim that the military in whatever conditions or environment 
should not and will not interfere with the democratic process and the democratic society need 
to be reminded of the consequences. 
Another point to reiterate is the importance of ensuring that the military is defined as 
civil servants, even with the capacity as managers of violence. Even when arguments 
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Among the military elites and the civilian masters where there would bea difficult situation 
for civilian control if there are redefined as non-civil servants, or if the military is branched 
out into a separate division that is still subservient to the civilian authority but only answers 
to the Secretary General of its ministry and the military elites. This would also be another 
field to be researched further. 
The final point to conclude is the portrayal of the military as being professional and 
their code of ethics has made people particularly in Malaysia has been lured into thinking that 
the military is indeed trustworthy and should be given the chance to administer certain 
aspects of governance in the country. Fortunately for Malaysia this has not occurred, and for 
the nation’s survival in the 21st century it should continue to be this way to remain 
competitive and strong. For Malaysia, the journey towards a free and sovereign country is to 
be stable politically and socially, and peaceful and prosperous, this can be achieved with a 
stable government, a good check and balance between the three branches of the judiciary, the 
legislative and the executive and a military that is professional and continue to remain 
apolitical and subservient to the civilian government chosen by the people through free and 
fair electoral process. 
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Bil 
Chief of Defense Force  
PanglimaAngkatanTentera  
Duration of Appointment 
1 General Tunku Osman Tunku Mohammad Jewa 
 
1 January 1964-24 
November 1969 
2 General Tan Sri Abdul Hamid bin Bidin 
 
25 November 1969-30 June 
1970 
3 General Tun Ibrahim bin Ismail 
 
1 July 1970-30 November 
1977 
4 General Tan Sri Dato' Haji Mohd Sany bin Haji Abdul Ghaffar 
 
1 December 1977-19 
January 1981 
5 General Tan Sri Dato' Mohd Ghazali bin Mohd Seth 
 
20 January 1981-31 October 
1985 
  
6 General Tan Sri Dato' Mohd Ghazali bin Haji Che Mat 
 
1 November 1985-5 October 
1987 
7 General Tan Sri Dato' Mohamed Hashim bin Mohd Ali 
 
6 October 1987-10 April 
1992 
8 General Tan Sri Yaacob bin Mohd Zain 
 
11 April 1992-3 March 1993 
9 General Tan Sri Haji Abdul Rahman bin Haji Abdul Hamid 
 
4 Mac 1993-31 January 
1994 
10 General Tan Sri Borhan bin Haji Ahmad 
 
1 February 1994-2 February 
1995 
11 General Tan Sri Dato' Seri Ismail bin Haji Omar 
 
3 February 1995-31 
December 1998 
  
12 General Tan Sri Dato' Seri Mohd Zahidi bin Haji Zainuddin 
 
1 January 1999-28 April 
2005 
13 Admiral Tan Sri Dato' Seri Mohd Anwar bin Hj Mohd Nor (First Navy CDF) 
 
29 April 2005-31 January 
2007 
14 General Tan Sri Dato' Sri Abdul Aziz bin Hj Zainal 
 
1 February 2007-31 August 
2009 
15 
 
General Tan Sri Dato' Sri Azizan bin Ariffin TUDM 
(First Air Force CDF) 
 
 
1 September 2009-14 June 
2011 
16 General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd. Zin Malaysian Army 
 
15 Jun 2011- as of 
publication 
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